'relevant parts', and made some minor adjustments to the central and final chapters (on value, exchange, price and money 2 ).
If we compare the two editions, the 'relevant parts' mentioned by the editor are Chapter I (on human needs), and the second half of Chapter IV (on the two meaning of 'economic' 3 ).
According to the editor, Menger's intense work on the revision of his Principles was mainly due to his dissatisfaction with the definition of a human need he gave in the first edition. In the second edition, Menger reformulated the first prerequisite of an economic good as follows: no longer simply "a human need", but "the perception or the anticipation of a human need" (Menger 1923, 11) . As Menger himself wrote in his notes, a new chapter on human needs was to come before the chapter on goods, because the nature of goods cannot be wholly understood without a deeper understanding of the nature of human needs.
Menger's shift from individual needs to social needs
In the first edition, Menger wrote that an economic good requires four prerequisites:
the presence of a human need; some properties able to render a thing capable of being brought into a causal connection with the satisfaction of this need; the human knowledge of this causal connection, a command of the thing sufficient to direct it to the satisfaction of the need. In the second edition, Menger reformulates the first prerequisite of an economic good as follows: no longer simply "a human need", but 2 The first scholar who studied the relationship between Carl Menger's archive and the making of his Principles was Yagi (Yagi,1993) , who described the genesis of Menger's first edition (1871). For a detailed story about the relation between the published edition of Menger's Principles and his notes and marginalia, see also Yagi's essay at http://chssl.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/menger/essay1.html.
"the perception or the anticipation of a human need" (Menger 1923, 11) , and defined a human need as "the starting point of any economic inquiry" [p.1].
He also clearly claimed that the human economy can be studied from two different perspectives: a subjective one (based on the economic behavior of individual agents and their needs), and a collective one (based on the economic behavior of social groups and their needs). According to Menger, the latter wasn't adequately explained The general definition of an economic good is to be a means to satisfy a human need. Social goods are particular economic goods able to satisfy social needs.
Usually, a social group is simply defined as the sum of its individual components; in this case it is possible to apply the mechanisms of individual behavior to social dynamics.
Nevertheless, there are situations in which social groups are more than the sum of their parts, and the analogy between individual behavior and groups dynamics no longer work appropriately.
To explain this passage, Menger introduced: a) common needs, b) collective needs, and c) needs of human associations. As a logical consequence, three different social goods are required for their satisfaction: a) common goods, b) collective goods, and c) goods of human associations [p.7] 6 . a. Common needs are shared by many individuals. They might be satisfied by each of them in a separate way (to give an example, Menger suggested the drawing of drinking water by separate house wells or jointly by a single well (e.g. owned by a monopolist)) [p.7] . The source (demand) of these common needs is still individual; the supply of common goods to satisfy them can be provided either by individual agents in a competitive market form, or by a producer in a monopoly.
b. Collective needs arise when individuals, who share the same common need, require a delegate agency able to provide a common good demanded by the community as a whole. They correspond to the modern meaning of "public goods"
7
. 'Private transport facilities and private schools' are examples used by Menger [p.8] . In this case, the demand still comes from individuals, more precisely from the sum of all individuals who are part of the same social group.
The supply of collective goods requires a producer who can't be the individual or the social group (again, the market form does not matter). This is the difference between common goods (a) and collective goods (b). In this case,
Menger is still maintaining his original individualistic approach. 'die Gemeinde'). As soon as they emerge, they assume an independent life ('ein selbständiges Leben'). They are no longer just means ('Mittel') to satisfy common or collective needs; they are subjects with their own personality ('Eigene Persönlichkeit'), following their own purposes ('Eigene Zwecke') [p.
9].
7 Usually, the origin of the term in German economic literature is traced back to Adolph Wagner's "Gemeinbedürfnisse" (Grundlegung der politischen Ökonomie, 1892), and Emil Sax's notion of (Menger 1994, 123-129) .
As Menger wrote: "in all of the cases above, the state shall actively intervene in the economic life of its citizens. Such intervention spells neither paternalism nor the exercise of control and thus a handicap, but wholesome protection and the representation and support of the community for the greatest happiness of the whole and its parts". And he continued: "there is still another kind of useful intervention, namely when the state interferes powerfully with the economic activities of certain individuals in order to protect the community against their detrimental schemings" (Menger 1994, 125) .
A new economic agent: the human associations
Human associations as new economic agents who demand an economic good to satisfy a human need can be regarded as a shift from a strict individualism to a more complex approach to the nature of economic agents. This shift in Menger's thought can also be regarded as a natural consequence of the concept of institutions he had Reading the second edition, the "German influence" on Menger seems to be even stronger: the introduction of human associations, in some way, bridged the gap between Mengerian individualism and German holism. Some authors already underlined the presence of both individualism and "holism" in Menger's methodological approach (Krabbe 1988; Shearmur 1990 ) as well as some important differences between Menger's organicism and Hayek's pure subjectivism (Garrouste 1994) . Some others recognize the essential role of the State concerning the emergence and the evolution of money (Hodgson 2001 , Ikeda 2008 Hayek wrote, Spann (not Mises) first introduced the logic of the means/ends relationship: "he had some helpful things to say on the logic of means-ends relationship but soon moved into region of philosophy which to most of us seemed to have little to do with economics" (Hayek 1992, pp. 22-23) .
Mises had been isolating himself from other Viennese colleagues mainly because of his intransigent liberalism and his struggle against socialism (Chaloupek 1990 , Hayek 1992 , Boettke 2001 , Caldwell 2007 
Menger's Reinassance at the LSE
As is well-known, in the early 1930's Hayek went to the LSE at Mises' suggestion. He joined the newly appointed professor Lionel Robbins, and they became close friends (Howson 2013) . Once Hayek moved to London they started a challenging new project: the building up of a microeconomic theory based on a strict methodological individualism and the notion of scarcity.
The most important result of this project was the publication of Robbins' book in 1932 where he rejected the conception of economics as the study of the causes of material wealth, and defined economics as "the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses" (Robbins 1932, 15 (Robbins 1932, 56) , and on Menger's struggle against the holism of the German historicism tradition (Robbins 1932, 96) .
Robbins was very influenced by Mises and Hayek while working on his book (Howson 2011, 210) . On the other side, both Mises and Hayek were so deeply satisfied by the book that Mises used it in his seminar in Vienna, where Robbins was invited to give some lectures (Howson 2011, 232 ).
In such a framework we have to think about the re-publication of Menger's works, Hayek noted that Menger refused to reprint and/or translate the first edition, but he postponed the project of a second edition because "other tasks claimed his prior attention" (Hayek 1934, 410 (Hayek 1934, 416) .
The reception of Menger's Collected Works went to the direction Hayek and Robbins had wished. A few years later, scholars and economists considered the introduction of subjectivism in economics as Menger's main role in the history of economics (Sweezy 1936; Bloch 1940) , and Robbins' and Hayek's recent publications were regarded as "directly affected by Menger's methodology" (Sweezy 1936, 724) 
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. In a paper published in 1937, George Stigler praised the LSE's efforts to rediscover classics in order to reinforce this approach, and he underlined the importance of Menger as the most important theorist of subjective value. Stigler also regretted "Menger's failure to develop generally the method by which the individual maximizes his want-satisfaction" (Stigler 1937, 239) .
The second edition of Menger's Principles was completely forgotten: Hayek's and
Robbins' choice became unquestionable.
Menger at Chicago
During the following decade, Hayek's efforts were directed toward clarifying his own methodology. Menger (not translated into English yet) was presented as a follower of the 'true individualism', together with 'Adam Smith and his school' and in opposition to the 'false individualism' based on Descartes' and Rousseau's rationalism (Hayek 1948, 4 (Knight, 1950, 16) ; and he also considered Menger's definition of cost as a good of higher order as fallacious: "Perhaps the most serious defect in production as a process of converting goods of higher order into goods of lower order. This involves a fallacious view of the economic process and in particular of the role of time. In the first place, there is in fact no such serial sequence. It would call for the existence of good of a supreme or highest order, not produced by higher goods, and in the economic meaning there are no such goods." (Knight, 1950, 25) 12 .
Reasons why Knight translated Menger's should be found in a different scenario. The role of Menger in the history of economics is no longer as strictly theoretical as it was in London two decades before; it was rather political. Menger was depicted as a Founding Father of economic liberalism.
Knight claimed that Menger's (and his Austrian followers') merit was mainly to have embedded the new economic theory they proposed (marginalism) within the ideology of the free competition, in the only possible political framework (liberalism). Menger had been seen as a revolutionary thinker, not just because he brought the subjectivevalue theory into the general definition of economics and he had been a "pioneer of the modern theory of utility" (Knight, 1950, 10) , but because the primacy of subjectivism in economic principles considers the act of "economizing" as the only possible free choice and liberalism as the only possible free contest.
As Knight wrote one year later: "economic principles are simply the more general implications of the single principle of freedom, individual and social, i.e., free association, in a certain sphere of activity. The sphere is that of economizing, i.e., conduct in which quantitative means are used to achieve quantitative ends" (Knight 1951, 7) . The primacy of subjectivism has as an immediate consequence the primacy of the market: "the perfect market (miscalled perfectly competitive) is unreal but conceptually necessary. It is the embodiment of complete freedom (…) The freedom in question centers in the right of each to be the judge of his own values and of the use of his own means to achieve them" (Knight 1951, 8) .
Robbins' endorsement of Menger's subjectivism was a matter of theoretical foundation of the discipline; Knight's endorsement was a political and ideological choice.
The English translation of Menger's Principles brought Karl Polanyi, who was teaching at Columbia University at that time, to reconsider Menger's work as a whole.
He discovered the second edition of Menger's Principles and subsequently regarded
Knight's use of Menger (and by Hayek and Robbins earlier) as an abuse (Polanyi 1971) 13 .
Polanyi's critique was two part 14 .
He blamed Hayek for intentionally refusing to reprint the second edition because of Menger's introduction of "the two basic directions of the human economy" (Polanyi 1971; Cangiani 2006 , Becchio 2011 in Chapter IV. The first one is a subjective direction, based on the use of goods to satisfy needs (later reformulated by Robbins 13 Polanyi didn't read the German edition of Menger's second edition when it was published despite living in Vienna and attending Mises' private seminars. (Polanyi and Mendell 1987; as the formal aspect of the logic of rational choice later reformulated by Robbins) , and already present in the first edition. The second direction, added by Menger in the second edition, is objective and represents the total amount of goods and labor,
given by natural and social conditions of a society as a whole [Menger 1923, 60 and 72-79] 15 .
On one side, Hayek's choice to reprint the first edition did not allow the reader to know that Menger had been developing a more complex meaning of 'economic'; on the other side, it implicitly gave a sort of ex ante endorsement of Robbins' definition of 'economic' provided by Menger, as the only possible meaning of 'economic'.
According to Polanyi, the situation got worse later in Chicago.
In the first edition, Menger had used the term 'wirtschaftende' as a synonym of 'ökonomischen' (to be 'engaged in economic activity'). Also, his use of 'wirtschaftende' had two meanings ('related to the allocation of means in a context of scarcity', and 'related to the way of saving resources for any future need').
Although a proper translation would have depended on the context of the sentence, only the expression 'economizing' (related to scarcity) was adopted, with no further distinction. In fact, when the translation was carried on, the English word 'economizing' no longer meant 'engaged in economic activity'; its meaning was restricted to the formal aspect of the rational allocation of scarce resources.
In the second edition, Menger was much clearer on this point: he distinguished between 'wirtschaftende' when he was referring to allocation based on scarcity, and Polanyi's "conspiracy theory" rises some relevant points. He rightly maintained that
Menger's main concern in revising his Principles was to give a broader definition of 'economic'. This is well known, and drafts of his second edition as well as marginalia on his copy of the second edition confirm it.
Despite this, Polanyi completely misunderstood Menger when he maintained that (economics as a science). 18 Polanyi's interpretation of Menger's Chapter IV is mostly biased by his personal struggle against the formalist tradition in economics and anthropology, which he considered unable "to recognize any other form of economy than the one based on market-price mechanism: the self-regulation of the market is never questioned, and the economist's question is reduced to the understanding of how does it work" (Polanyi, 1971, 17 Polanyi's concern about the wrong translation of 'wirtschaftend' is much more consistent in the story of a possible manipulation of Menger's contributions and in the bad fate of the latest Menger.
Conclusions
The followers of the Austrian school have been always aware of the misfortune of the second edition of Menger's Principles; and Hayek's and Knight's decisions were never questioned. The history of the second edition does not concern the Austrian tradition alone, however.
19 Yet, the specific meaning of these two directions follows from the two extreme examples provided by Menger on p. 78: (1) On the one hand, an economy would be fully determined by the technical direction (the objective aspect) if the resources at hand, suitably arranged, would suffice for completely satisfying all human needs. In such a situation of affluence the economy would be characterized only by its technical aspect, the task would consist in putting the existing resources to alternative uses in such a way that affluence can indeed be accomplished. (2) On the other hand, if the resources of an economy were rigidly given (and neither production nor the transfer of resources to alternative uses possible), then only the economizing direction (the subjective aspect) would be relevant for this economy. In this sense, economizing is the response to scarcity. I own this specification to an anonymous referee, to whom I am very grateful.
If the missed re-publication, as well as the non-translation into English, are contextualized within the debate surrounding the building of the present meaning of 'economic' into the mainstream, they become important for the history of the discipline as a whole.
Menger 
